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Despite tremendous reforms from the Government of Kenya and NHIF to improve access to 
insurance coverage among its most vulnerable population, the health insurance uptake among the 
poorest quintile remains low.  Many studies show that there is a high need for more diverse 
financial service options (such as savings products) that will help people manage short-term 
liquidity and long-term investment in the face of tremendous uncertainty in their incomes and 
consumption needs – unforeseen healthcare expenses being a major example of a significant 
unexpected household consumption need. This study evaluates the effects of introducing financial 
(monetary) incentives on health savings’ levels in a context among savings’ groups using a 
“mobile-health wallet (m-health wallet) which is a mobile platform dedicated saving and spending 
for healthcare expenses only.  The study explores secondary data collected during a study that 
introduced the m-health wallet savings product among low-income earners who are members of 
20 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) in Nairobi and Uasin Gishu counties. 
Data from the m-health wallet platform from the 208 ROSCAs members were collected and the 
present researched analyzed- using multiple linear regression analysis and Student's independent 
sample t-test - the effect of different types of financial incentives on savings’ levels; and using the 
differences in savings between rural and urban areas. Findings from the study indicate that 
financial incentives did not result in increased savings and that ROSCAs in urban areas saved more 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Kenyan health sector relies heavily on out-of-pocket payments (OOP) which represent almost 
26.6% of Kenya total health expenditure (Ministry of Heatlh, 2015). OOP remain the main form 
of fragmentation in the Kenyan health system and this leads to high inequity in access to health 
services. Each year, Kenyan households spend over a tenth of their budget on health care payments. 
The burden of out-of-pocket payments is highest among the poor. The poorest households spent a 
third of their resources on health care payments each year compared to only 8% spent by the richest 
households (Chuma & Okungu, 2011). In other words, close to 2.6 million Kenyans (6.2 %) of 
households are at risk of impoverishment as a consequence of expenditure on health care depleting 
household savings and were at a risk of falling into poverty (Ministry of Health, 2015).  
 
The need to provide quality and equitable health services and protect populations from 
impoverishing health care costs has pushed universal health coverage (UHC) to the top of global 
health policy agenda. UHC is a priority policy agenda worldwide and is one of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The SDG3, where UHC falls, is driven by the need for improved 
access to quality health services for all and protection of the population from catastrophic and 
impoverishing health care costs (Okungu et al, 2017). In Kenya, government health policy has 
prioritized contributory financing strategy as the main financing mechanism for UHC through the 
Government National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), which is the largest insurance provider in 
the country.  
 
Despite tremendous reforms from the Government and NHIF to improve access to insurance 
coverage among its most vulnerable population, the health insurance uptake among the poorest 
quintile remains low. According to the Business Call to Action Coalition report (BCtA, 2016), that 
uptake is estimated at 2.9 per cent, compared to 41.5 per cent in the wealthiest quintile. Within the 
insured fraction of the poorest quintile, the NHIF covers the majority (92.5%), while private health 
insurance providers and community- based health insurance schemes cover only 3.6 per cent and 
3.4 per cent, respectively. Whereas the uptake of insurance coverage within the poorest quintile 
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has doubled since 2007, when it stood at 1 per cent, in terms of absolute numbers, this increase is 
only modest compared to the increase in the wealthier quintiles. For instance, insurance coverage 
in the fourth and in the wealthiest quintiles currently stands at 25.4 per cent and 41.5 per cent, 
respectively, compared to 11.2 per cent and 26.4 per cent, respectively. These statistics confirm 
that people at the Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) are more vulnerable to the impoverishing 
consequences of ill health than the wealthier quintiles. Households without insurance cover are 
often forced to pay substantial medical bills out-of-pocket when seeking medical care. These 
payments interrupt their living standards and may even push them further into poverty. 
 
Many studies show that there is an enormous need for more diverse financial service options that 
will help people manage short-term liquidity and long term investment in the face of tremendous 
uncertainty in their incomes and consumption needs – unforeseen healthcare expenses being a 
major example of a significant unexpected household consumption need (FSD Kenya, 2014). 
Access to preventive or curative effective health products, has been limited due in large part to 
poverty and the absence of financial markets that would enable poor households to invest in health 
on credit. Given such constraints, poor households should save in anticipation of future health 
shocks. However, substantial evidence suggests that they lack adequate savings products, and, as 
a result, households are quite vulnerable to health shocks. In order to afford medical expenditures, 
they resort to drawing down productive assets or business capital or to other costly risk-coping 
strategies (Dupas & Robinson, 2013).  The Medical or Health Savings accounts are some of the 
products introduced to address health inequity in some parts of the world. These products which 
emerged in response to concerns of escalating healthcare costs in developed countries, consist of 
individuals saving and paying for their own medical need (World Health Report, 2010).  However, 
these products, which have a limited penetration in Africa (only in South Africa) have mainly been 
implemented in the formal sector through tax incentives.  
In Kenya, health savings products for the BoP also needs to leverage on mobile technology. The 
potential for mobile money to transform healthcare accessibility among low-income groups is 
enormous, tapping into extensive mobile infrastructure to reach the 1.7 billion unbanked people 
who have mobile phones. Kenya is witnessing an unprecedented uptake of mobile money 
technology in terms of the number of mobile money subscribers, number and value of transactions 
as well as the number of agents. According to latest statistics from the Central Bank of Kenya, as 
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at April 2015, the country had 26.13 million mobile money transfer customers, who completed 
84.91 million mobile money transactions cumulatively valued at KES 213.75 billion ($2.4 billion) 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2015). In 2014, a total of KES 2,371.8 billion ($26.8 billion) was 
transacted through mobile money platforms, implying that approximately 43.3 per cent of the 
country’s GDP is transacted through these platforms.  According to Mobile for Development 
(M4D) impact tracker and GSM Association (GSMA), the number of mobile money services that 
increase access to health tripled between 2009 and 2014. In Kenya, mobile money is increasingly 
finding application in increased access to health to people at the BoP. This has been driven largely 
by two factors:  the accessibility to mobile phones by people at the BoP; and the acceptance of 
mobile money as a payment method. A study conducted by GSMA revealed that 60 per cent of 
Kenyans earning less than $2.50 per day have access to a mobile phone (Seale, 2009). 
A study conducted on the current role of M-PESA- the Safaricom mobile-money product- in 
facilitating access to health services in Kenya, showed the following: (i) the mobile-money product 
is already used to mobilize funds quickly to receive health care;(ii) most use of M-PESA for 
payment of treatment is indirect;(ii) Health care providers are incorporating M-PESA into their 
service provision models to increase access. As such M-PESA can play a crucial role in the health 
sector through two ways: first, to quickly mobilize funds from friends and relatives in order to seek 
timely health care, and second to facilitate transfer of funds to meet travel costs to the hospital and 
to pay for the health care. The study also recommends that through introduction of low-cost savings 
products, such as health savings cards, M-PESA platform could bring benefit to low-income 
Kenyans whether or not they receive any remittances (Haas & Nagarajan, 2011).  
A Financial Diaries study conducted in Kenya (FSD Kenya, 2014) confirms the low usage of 
formal or informal savings tools as we hardly see anyone saving for future healthcare expenses. 
They do put money aside (‘earmark’) for  emergencies or unexpected expenses for any kind, but 
also these cases account to less than 16% of the saved amounts in Kenya. To understand how low-
income families can be triggered to save for health, a research project in rural Kenya (Dupas & 
Robinson, 2015) designed multiple savings devices with stronger and softer commitments to save 
for preventive health or health emergencies.  Their main conclusions were: (1) simply providing a 
safe place to keep money was sufficient to increase health savings by 66 percent, (2) adding an 
earmarking feature was only helpful when funds were put towards emergencies, or for individuals 
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that are frequently taxed by friends and relatives and (3) group-based savings and credit schemes 
have very large savings effects. 
In 2013, two organizations developed a mobile- health wallet (m-health wallet) that restricts the 
use of mobile money to pay bills at a limited set of healthcare providers. The development of this 
m-health wallet was based on the potential identified by mobile money product such as M-Pesa 
can have on health savings and expenditures. M-Pesa is known for its fast, reliable and cost 
effective way to transfer payments and remittances between persons and businesses across the 
country. An M-Pesa based system can play a crucial role in the health sector through two pathways: 
(i) to quickly mobilize funds from friends and relatives in order to seek timely health care, and (ii) 
to facilitate transfers of funds to meet travel costs to the hospital and to pay for the health care. 
The increased speed of payment can have positive effects on the health of the individual as well 
as potentially reducing the overall costs of treatment by preventing potential further deterioration 
of the condition. It can also decrease the amount the individual and caregivers spend away from 
other productive work. Not to forget that immediate payment for received health services helps to 
keep down the costs of the health care provider and allows the organization to provide better-
quality services. To date, the use of M-Pesa for attaining health services has been primarily indirect 
– users receive funds through M-Pesa and cash out the money to pay for services independent from 
the providers (Haas & Nagarajan, 2011). 
It is in this context of low insurance penetration but high potential for innovative mobile –based 







 1.2. Statement of the problem 
Currently risk pooling in Kenya is minimal and hence, cross-subsidisation is very limited. Apart 
from tax funding, other forms of pooling include the NHIF, private health insurance, Community 
Based Health Insurances and to some extent donor funding where funds are channelled through 
the general budget support. While the value of risk-pooling or saving for health purposes can be 
particularly high, many researchers don’t yet see low-income families in developing countries save 
to deal with the financial consequences of illnesses (c) while they do take credit in case of health 
emergencies. Furthermore, with little access to funds among the poor to afford preventative care 
and high incidence of diseases, many Kenyans find themselves in a situation where emergency 
medical care is necessary but not unaffordable with funds on hand.  
To date, studies analyzing the effects of financial incentives on health, from a demand-side 
perspective, mainly focused on evaluating their impact on health seeking behavior or health 
outcomes.  Indeed, most researches have analyzed demand-side financing or financial incentives’ 
strategies used such as cash transfer programs, microcredit, user fee removal policies and voucher 
schemes (providing direct or indirect monetary incentives to households) on health seeking 
behavior and health outcomes (Gopalan et al., 2014). In addition, these demand-side financing 
programs cannot be assimilated to direct financial incentives.   
With a focus on the informal sector in Africa, this study investigated the effect of a more or less 
similar concept using an innovative technology solution: the so-called mobile-health wallet (or m-
health wallet). The m-health wallet is a mobile platform that connects patients with healthcare 
providers and payers. The product was launched in Kenya with “M-TIBA” as a brand name. From 
the patient perspective, the m-health wallet is a wallet on a mobile phone (feature phone or 
smartphone) containing specified entitlements for healthcare. It is open for any sponsor to 
contribute any amount or benefits for any healthcare purpose for any Kenyan. Donors can provide 
certain healthcare benefits (e.g. maternal, chronic, malaria) to certain segments of the population. 
Family members can remit money for designated healthcare usage of individuals. Individuals or 
savings groups such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) may use the m-health 
wallet to save collectively for healthcare. The study investigated the effects of introducing the m-
health wallet to ROSCAs as a mobile-health savings product.  ROSCAs normally save on a 
weekly, bi-weekly or monthly-basis and function like “Merry go round” (every round another 
member receives the pot of savings). Selected ROSCAs were offered the opportunity to use the 
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m-Health wallet to save a certain amount of money for health expenses. The amount was agreed 
upon as a group but for individual use.  
The m-Health Wallet savings product was introduced to low-income earners who are members of 
ROSCAs in Nairobi and Uasin Gishu. Different financial incentives were introduced to observe 
uptake and if the use of the m-Health Wallet is viable amongst the targeted groups. This would 
enable these ROSCAs members to access and pay for health care services without having to rely 
on available out of pockets. 
1.3. Research objectives  
The main objective of the study was to analyze the effects of financial incentives on health savings 
and explore their effectiveness in addressing health needs during the study period.  
The research specific objectives were the following: 
I. To establish the existence or lack thereof of differences in savings between the 
incentive groups;  
II. To compare the effect of financial (monetary) incentives among other variables on 
health savings’ levels; 
III. To analyse differences in health savings between urban and rural areas 
The research questions were the following:  
i. Does financial incentive trigger increased health savings?  
ii. How are financial incentives influencing health savings in comparison with other 
variables? 
iii. Are there any differences between health savings in urban and rural areas? 
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1.4. Scope of the study 
The study was implemented among 20 existing ROSCAs in the slum areas of Nairobi and 20 
ROSCAs in the rural areas in Uasin Gishu. Both areas were selected for the following reasons: (i) 
presence of network of health facilities supporting the m-health wallet solution (they were 
connected and staff trained on the m-health wallet system) and (ii) the areas were inhabited by 
low-income earners who are mostly non-insured groups targeted for health savings’ product. They 
were also selected because of the presence of health facilities supporting the m-health wallet 
solution. This selection will allow for a fair representation of ROSCAs health savings and seeking 
behaviours in both rural and urban areas among low-income target groups.  
1.5. Significance of the Study 
Findings from the study were deemed essential in helping to improve people’s (working poor) 
ability to deal with unforeseen health events as financial preparedness is an essential element of 
access to healthcare. Not only will the intervention help avoid financial shocks when falling ill. It 
will offer alternative choices to beneficiaries among to access private providers where treatment 
could potentially be received at closer proximity and/or with less waiting time and/or at better 
quality than the public sector. The study will also be beneficial for health organizations (public, 
private or NGOs) interested in designing affordable health covers for low-income groups. 
Especially with the current political drive for reaching Universal Health Coverage in Kenya and 
Africa, the study will provide some insights of both public and private players in this arena. Finally 
yet importantly, this study will also be of interest for organizations targeting ROSCAs with 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The following part discusses the earlier theoretical and empirical literature relating to saving 
behavior challenge and potential in low-income groups.  
 
2.1. Theoretical literature 
2.1. 1.  Saving behavior theories 
Saving is generally referred as a portion of an income that a business or an individual remains with 
after consumption. According to Lunt, “Saving represents that part of income which is reserved 
for future use and may therefore serve to create enduring wealth” (Lunt, 1996). 
The Life-cycle hypothesis introduced by Modigliani and Brumsberg (1954) is one of the most 
important economic saving theories. The main concept of the life-cycle hypothesis is that 
individuals or households try to keep their expenditures constant over the life-cycle: when income 
is lower than expected average life-cycle earnings, money would be borrowed; when income is 
higher than expected, the surplus would be saved. In other words, people are expected to optimize 
expenditure over their life span (Deaton, 2005). 
Although the life-cycle theory attempts to predict differences in saving behaviour over the life 
cycle, other studies (King, 1985; Juster, 1986; Thaler, 1990, 1992) were not able to confirm the 
expected saving behaviours of individuals or households at different stages in the life cycle; for 
instance the young and old people did not behave as expected (Wärneryd, 2000). 
Indeed, as mentioned by Hungerford (Hungerford, 2006) economic reasons start from the premise 
that individuals and families are rational and make optimal decisions about consumption and 
saving throughout the life course. However behavioral reasons start from the premise that 
individuals and families do not always make optimal decisions regarding consumption and saving.  
While most studies have focused on modeling lifetime resources and preferences in the way that 
best captures characteristics of individuals and the economic environment, including the fact that 
predictions about the future are uncertain, the life-cycle hypothesis did not take into account the 
fact that refraining from consumption and making saving decisions may be very difficult.  Indeed, 
individuals are faced with several challenges: they may have to spend a lot of time and effort 
collecting information required to make saving decisions; they may lack the financial literacy 




It is the behavioural life-cycle model (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) that acknowledges that saving is 
difficult. This hypothesis is linked to the life-cycle hypothesis but incorporates self-control, mental 
accounting and framing (how alternatives are perceived from a chosen point of reference). And as 
such is closer to modelling the real man (versus the economic man).  
 
2.1.2. Saving and self-control problem  
Several theories acknowledging psychological barriers to saving practices, especially in low-
income settings have been put forward.  
The model of hyperbolic discounting model defined by Herrnstein (1961) describes individuals as 
being present-oriented, with more regard for current or immediate satisfaction rather than delayed 
satisfaction. As a result, people end up delaying certain decisions, such as saving mechanisms. 
Given two options, humans tend to show a preference for a more immediate, smaller value reward 
rather than waiting for a later, higher value reward (Rubinstein, 2003). This conflict of time 
preferences results in hyperbolic discounting, or intertemporal preferences (Angeletos, Laibson, 
Repetto, Tobacman, & Weinberg, 2001). In addition, psychological factors, such as impatience 
and issues of self-control (involving competing preferences dictating different actions at different 
times) may influence savings negatively.  
Self-control problems were found much higher among the BoP and credit constrained because the 
cost of deviating from personal rules is limited when one has very little to lose. Banerjee and Duflo 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2006) argue that there are “temptation goods” (goods whose consumption 
yields utility in the present, but whose future consumption yields no utility), which serves as a 
“temptation tax” on savings. If there is satiation in temptation goods such that their consumption 
share declines with income, then a poverty trap can emerge since poor people face a higher 
effective tax and therefore have a lower incentive to save than richer people. Both theories are 
consistent with studies which find demand for some form of commitment among people in 
developing countries (Nava et al., 2006), (Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011), (Brune et al., 2013).  
This review of theoretical literature indicates that when studying savings’ behavior among the low-
income population, one must consider the behavioral theories rather than classical economic 
theories. These latter emphasize the psychological and socio-economic barriers that influence 
human beings in making their financial decisions for saving. 
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2.2. Empirical review 
The study investigated the effects of introducing monetary incentives in a context of group savings 
(ROSCAs) using a commitment device earmarked for health (m-health wallet). The objective here 
is to combine different tested interventions meant to increase savings. This section provides a 
review of findings from different experiments conducted to influence savings especially among 
the poor.   
2.2.1. Effects of incentives on savings 
According to Hungerford (Hungerford, 2006) there have been many empirical studies to test why 
people save in an economy based on these theorist. Many reasons were given depending on various 
factors such as age, gender, educational background, income level, family size, culture, and 
religion. John Maynard Keynes (1936) argued that there are eight primary reasons or motives 
leading individuals to save:  
• Precaution motive: “To build up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies 
• Foresight motive: “To provide for an anticipated future relation between the income 
and the needs of the individual or his family different from that which exists in the 
present,” 
• Calculation motive: “To enjoy interest and appreciation,” 
• Improvement motive: “To enjoy gradually increasing expenditures,” 
• Independence motive: “To enjoy a sense of independence and the power to do things,” 
• Enterprise motive: “To secure a masse de manœuvre to carry out speculative or 
business projects,” 
• Pride (bequest) motive: “To bequeath a fortune,” and 
• Avarice motive: “To satisfy pure miserliness.” 
 
The proposed study focuses on the calculation motive to save, translated in monetary (financial) 
incentives in the context of an enforced commitment to save (through ROSCA and locked box 
device). A study conducted in Uganda suggests that Wealth, proximity to financial institutions, 
financial education, and financial incentives are positively associated with higher saving 
performance. (Chowa, Masa, & Ansong, 2012). These findings are aligned with results from 
similar studies conducted in the United States. Therefore financial incentives can be considered as 
a method to encourage savings for health.  
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However saving for healthcare costs, which the study focused on, falls under the “precautionary” 
motive for saving.  (Ziegelmeyer, 2012)  established various factors that significantly affect 
precautionary motive of saving. They are defined as motives arising from uncertainties concerning 
future income and/or expenditures. These factors are income fluctuations, health risk, longevity 
risk, current income, education, etc. According to Ziegelmeyer,   precautionary savings in the US 
increase by 10.9% for a household with significant income fluctuations compared to a household 
with no income fluctuations, holding all other factors constant. But the results indicated that health 
risk does not significantly affect precautionary motive of saving. He stated that “poor expectations 
about the future health status do not change precautionary savings significantly”. As such there is 
a need to also consider what other motive can increase saving for health.  
Engen, Gale, Bernheim, and Slemrod (1994) in an assessment of the saving patterns in the United 
States posit that the saving trend in the country has been on the decline with an observed rate of 
8% average savings in 1950s to an average rate of 4.6% as of the early '90s. The trend therefore 
indicates that there likely would be a decline in financed investments and curtailed economic 
growth. In addressing these concerns, the authors focus on saving incentive plans for personal 
savings. The authors specifically assess the efficacy of various saving incentivization models. 
Findings from their study indicate that incentivization programs cannot be inferred, on the whole, 
to be effective; the specific structuring on the incentivization plan, rather than mere existence of 
the same, informs the success or ineffectiveness of the approach. Findings from this exposition on 
incentivized saving therefore indicate that focusing on healthcare savings, it is necessary to ensure 
that various nuances involved in incentivization programs are robustly investigated so as to 
generate a model factoring in the various variables that affect the efficacy of the saving initiative. 
In the context of the study, additional incentives to save are the so-called “commitment devices”: 
the ROSCA saving structure and the m-health wallet. According Gugerty (Gugerty, 2007), the 
psychology literature presents several mechanisms, both intra and extra personal to encouraging 
commitment for savings. Intrapersonal mechanisms include behavior such as removing the 
temptation from sight or making private rules with oneself governing behavior. Extra-personal 
mechanisms may include physical or social constraints on future choices, such as opening a 
savings account. An important point is that commitment devices, by tying the hands of individuals, 
may also make it easier to resist demands for sharing with their social network.  
(Gugerty, 2007) (Anderson & Baland, 2002) provide evidences that ROSCA are regarded as a 
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saving commitment device. Gugerty says that key feature of ROSCAs is their public nature and 
the inflexibility of their organization. Payments are made publicly, and groups monitor and enforce 
an individual’s payments to herself as well as her payments to the group. Many ROSCA 
participants also “bind their hands” through the use of a pre-commitment mechanism in which 
participants agree in advance on how they will use their funds and the group monitors the 
individual to ensure that she honors her commitment. Finally, most ROSCA participants report 
that they join ROSCAs in order to commit themselves to saving, “to get the strength to save.” Thus 
the inflexibility of ROSCAs is precisely the feature that is most valued by participants. 
 A study conducted among BoP ROSCAs in Kenya demonstrates that some of the funds saved in 
ROSCAs are used to finance health expenditures. In other words, ROSCAs can be considered as 
a mitigation mechanism for households to rely on to cope with health expenditures (Anand, n.d.).  
Taking into these studies, an experiment conducted by Dupas and Robinson (2013) among 
ROSCAs in Kenya suggests that introducing a commitment device as basic as a simple box with 
a lock and key allows the average individual to substantially increase the level of their health 
investment and as such to reduce household’s vulnerability to health shocks. The study also 
established that the mechanism through which this simple safe box enables savings is through a 
mental accounting effect. The money put into the box was mentally labeled by respondents as “for 
savings” and therefore less fungible, and as such was less likely to be spent on luxuries or given 
away to others. Usage of the box remained high for at least 33 months after it was introduced.  The 
study also demonstrated that a combination of simple storage mechanisms, earmarking for the 
savings for health purpose and social pressure from ROSCAs to save consistently had large 
impacts on health savings. Indeed this combination led to an increase of up to 138% in preventative 
health investment.  
A previous (internal) study conducted by one of the organization supporting the M-TIBA product 
indicated that ROSCAs members preferred the following incentives to save for health:  
- a start-up amount for free;  
- a percentage top-up  when you have reached a certain level of savings;   
- a bonus amount when you have reached a certain level of savings (this can also be given 
as free airtime);  
- an interest on savings;  
- an option of taking a m-health wallet loan. 
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The study assessed the efficacy of introducing different “interest on savings” to encourage savings 
for health among ROSCAs.   
 
2.2.2. Effects of financial incentives in savings for health or better health behaviors 
While conducting the proposed research, it is important to be aware that financial incentives in 
relation to changing behaviors can have a counter-effect. Corgnet (Corgnet et al., 2015) indicates 
that moving from no incentive to a positive incentive can dramatically change the framing of the 
interaction and shift an individual’s decision frame from social to monetary. For instance, in an 
experiment that involved students dragging a computerized ball to different parts of a screen, they 
find that those paid in candy do better than those paid in cash, presumably, because candy is a 
social reward rather than a monetary one. The differences between a social and a monetary reward 
may also change individuals’ beliefs about the behavior of others: for example, people may believe 
incentives are in place because the social norm is that people do not contribute. 
In addition, Dan Ariely (Ariely et al., 2009) shows that image concerns are another important 
motivation for contributing to public goods: people volunteer, recycle, donate blood, or behave 
pro-socially to show others that they are “nice.” Extrinsic rewards can crowd out image motivation 
by diluting the signal to oneself or others of a voluntary contribution: it becomes unclear whether 
a person is undertaking a social activity to “do good” or to “do well.” These findings indicate that 
monetary incentives for prosocial behavior work better when contributions to the public goods are 
not as visible (perhaps like investments in an energy-saving or pollution-reducing water boiler) 
than when they are visible and presumably done partly due to image concerns. It also implies that 
incentives for voluntary contributions should be provided privately rather than publicly, to reduce 
the effect on image motivation.  
Huskamp et al., (2003) assess the effectiveness of incentive-based formularies on prescription-
drug utilization and spending. The authors focus on two groups differing in the mode of 
incentivization through differences in co-payments for different-tier drugs. The results of the study 
indicate that cost-saving incentivization plans had an anomalous effect on the utilization of drugs 
– in that the associated changes in copayments were viewed to alter out-of-pocket spending by 
enrollees, the frequency of use medications, and effectively, the quality of care. The findings from 
this study therefore indicate that the effects of incentivization through savings in healthcare are 
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diverse and therefore such incentives may not necessarily be efficacious in light of the intended 
purpose. 
These are important findings to consider in a context of providing financial rewards to save for 
perceived “good practices” (healthcare) in a social environment such as ROSCAs.  
 
2.2.3. Differences in savings among target groups 
PJ Fisher (Fisher & Anong, 2012) indicates that evidence suggests that people know why they 
should save, but many don’t save, especially lower-income individuals and families. Therefore 
difference in saving’s behaviors can be observed between groups. 
Ensor and San (1996) focusing on research data from a 1995 study conducted in Northern Vietnam 
highlight the effect of healthcare costs among the poor. The authors, employing a panel study 
approach, highlight that following the introduction of user fees for healthcare services, the poorest 
were observed to pay relatively higher fees as compared to richer individuals suffering similar 
conditions; this was mainly due to delayed treatment on account of inaccessible funds. The authors 
further posit that although the system allows for provision of subsidized healthcare for the most 
affected, the implementation of the same is mostly lacking as the poorest appear to be adversely 
affected. Among the effects of increased spending on healthcare, among the poor, as reported by 
the researchers, has been the allocation of previously budgeted funds to offset healthcare payments 
thereby resulting in further financial struggles. The implication of this study therefore, is that ill-
fitting subsidiary plans implemented by the government may serve as on-paper solutions although 
the practical benefits of the same may be significantly lacking. 
Kempson, et al. (2005) focus on incentivized saving plans with a particular focus on the Savings 
Gateway scheme initiated in Britain in 2003. The study highlights that matched saving schemes 
are commonplace in the United States, Canada, and Australia with the most notable being the 
American Dream Demonstration (ADD) program comprising 13 different Individual Development 
Accounts with the largest having 470 accounts opened. The aims of the different matched-savings 
schemes are varied ranging from incentivization to save for education to the purchase of homes. 
In general, the authors observe that the structuring of government-sponsored matched payments 
was such as to ensure maximum benefit for the poor with matched payments of up to $3 for each 
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saved dollar. Findings from the ADD program suggest that low-income families are able to save 
but that additional income does not necessarily translate into additional savings.  
In a related study, Hogarth and Anguelov (2003) further provide insights on the ADD program 
postulating that the savings- model put forward in the program provides evidence that the poor can 
save and that with sufficient restructuring in the approaches to saving, substantial gains can be 
achieved in offsetting healthcare-related expenditure from accumulated funds. These findings are 
relevant to the ongoing study as they point to the fact that the poor are able, under the right 
incentivization plan, to save. However, the findings also indicate that various underlying factors 
affect the saving patterns among poorer populations in that the expected "higher savings with 
higher income" trend isn't a forgone conclusion among the demographic. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2007) provide a detailed account of the healthcare challenges faced by the 
poorest demographics across the world. The authors highlight that those living under $1.08 per 
day – defined as extremely poor – consume, on average, slightly less than 1400 calories a day. 
Focusing on the poor population in Udaipur, India, the authors posit that up to 72% report at least 
one symptom of illness which has left them bedridden over the period of one year and that up to 
55% of adults are anemic. In Peru, South Africa, East Timur and Tanzania, 11% to 15% indicate 
that a close relative had been bedridden over the period of one year with the figure rising to up to 
46% in Nicaragua, Udaipur and Mexico. The findings from this study indicate the dire implications 
of poverty on healthcare. In relation to the study, it is evident that although the effects on healthcare 
are front-and-central to the most affected, incentivization programs may be curtailed by the low 
earnings of the demographic given that any additional income would more likely go towards 
addressing such immediate needs as scarcity in daily food than to healthcare plans. Considering 
these findings, from this study, research investigated whether differences in savings behaviors are 





The literature review indicates that a number of key themes and variables were explored around 
the study; these are translated into the conceptual framework (figure 2.1) below: 


















Operationalization of variables 
The geographical location within which the study was conducted was dummy coded 1 for Uasin 
Gishu (rural area) and 0 for Nairobi (Urban area). Household size, number of children, number of 
adults, and age of respondents were included as discrete numerical variables whereas the incentive 
plans, 0%, 25% and 50% were further included as dummy variables with the 0% group forming 
Geographical 
Location 
(Uasin Gishu/ Nairobi) 
Household Size 
Number of children  
Number of adults  
Incentive Plan  
(0%, 25%, 50%) 
Total Contribution 




the base group; the two introduced variables – 25% and 50% - were coded, as necessary with 1 
indicating presence of the respective plans and 0 absence. The dependent variable, contribution 
ratio, was computed by dividing the cumulative contribution of the individuals by the anticipated 
total based on their committed monthly contributions; this therefore standardized the contributions 






















CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study focused on the effects of financial incentives on health savings. Findings forthcoming 
from the study will serve to shed light on the appropriateness of different incentivization 
approaches and the contribution of other variables in determining the amount saved by ROSCAs 
towards healthcare. This chapter provides an elucidation of the nature of the study and the data to 
be collected, and the approaches that was applied in arriving at the research findings. 
 
3.1 Study Design  
The study involved of a quantitative analysis of secondary data collected from a research 
conducted among ROSCAs. These secondary data were obtained from the m-health wallet 
platform which displays the savings amounts per ROSCAs members (after 6 months of introducing 
the intervention). The quantitative research is based on the measurement of quantity or amount; it 
is applicable to phenomena that can be expressed in terms of quantity (Kothari, 2004).  The study 
was exploratory in nature as it served to shed light on the applicability of different incentivization 
plans in increasing savings for healthcare (Sanders et al., 2011). 
 
3.2 Population and sampling  
The secondary data analyzed for this research were obtained from the previous study that covered 
3 low-income areas in Nairobi (urban) being Mathare, Kawangware and Sinaï and 6 areas in Uasin 
Gishu (rural) being Maraba, Meteitei, Tachasis, Chemase, Serem and Kapsengere villages. It is 
important to note that from a previous study conducted by one of the participating organizations, 
it was found that 84% of ROSCA’ members are women. These findings were taken into account 
in the sampling exercise to ensure collection of data from male ROSCA members. In determining 
the sample size, it was noted that a larger sample can yield more accurate results — but excessive 
responses can be pricey (Smith, 2013). 
 
The size of the target population (ROSCA members in the areas of research) for this particular 
study was estimated at 10,000. This number was calculated from the lists of all registered ROSCA 
in the selected areas of research that the researcher partly received through the Ministry of Gender 
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and Social Services and partly through Community Health Volunteers active in the areas of 
research. When using a confidence level of 95% and accepting a margin of error of 5%, the 
appropriate sample size for the study was set at 370 as shown in the calculation below: 
 




N: population size= 10,000 
e: margin of error= 5% 
z: z-score= 1.96 (for 95% confidence level) 
  
Among the 370 records collected, the data that could be utilized for this secondary analysis was 
sourced from a total of 208 respondents involved in mobile wallet incentivization program as data 
from 94 members were incomplete with changes in incentivization plans and missing 
incentivization schemes of up to two months in the study period. The data considered for the 
research under the 0% incentive, 25% and 50% incentives for a period of three full months and 
therefore formed the sample for the study. These therefore represented 75% of the total 
respondents in the study; and 56% of the anticipated sample size.  Baruch and Holtom (2008) 
observe that there is growing apathy in response to academic data gathering approaches; The 
authors surmise, following an investigation of 1607 studies, that the average acceptable response 
rate is 52.7%. The response rate for the study was therefore deemed satisfactory in making 
inferences regarding incentivization plans for the study population – ROSCA's involved in the 
wallet (m-health wallet) incentivization program conducted in Uasin Gishu and Nairobi. The unit 
of study is the individual participating as part of a ROSCA. Below is an overview of the secondary 




Table 3.1: Detailed breakdown of the quantitative sample 
  Total Total Nairobi Uasin Gishu 












































































ROSCA members TOTAL 100% 370 37 37 37 37 37 31 31 31 31 30 31 
                            
Nairobi 50% 185 37 37 37 37 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uasin Gishu 50% 185 0 0 0 0 0 31 31 31 31 30 31 
Females 70% 270 27 27 27 27 27 23 23 23 22 22 22 
Males 30% 100 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 9 8 9 
Aged between 20-35 years 50% 185 18 19 18 19 18 15 16 15 16 15 16 
Aged between 36-50 years 50% 185 19 18 19 18 19 16 15 16 15 15 15 
HH Income KES 5k-10k 50% 185 18 19 18 19 18 15 16 15 16 15 16 
HH Income KES 10k-20k 50% 185 19 18 19 18 19 16 15 16 15 15 15 
 
3.3 Data Collection Methods 
The study was retrospective in nature, therefore data collected was sourced from the wallet (m-
health wallet) initiative's stock data. The data was collected directly from the m-health wallet 
online platform which provides real-time data on each transactions performed by the users. Not all 
the information collected was deemed applicable for the ongoing study; as such, identifying 
information and ROSCA-specific information was left out with the collected including the 
variables area of study, house-hold size, number of children, number of adults, age of respondents, 
incentivization plans and total payments made. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis  
Three objectives were studied - to establish the existence or lack thereof of differences in savings 
between the incentive groups; to evaluate the effect of financial incentives on health-savings 
levels; and to analyze differences in health savings between urban and rural areas. The first 
objective, to establish the existence or lack thereof of differences in savings between the incentive 
groups was analyzed through an independent t-test so as to establish the presence or lack thereof 
of statistically inferred difference between the means of the two populations. The second objective, 
to evaluate the effect of financial incentives on health-savings levels was addressed through a 
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regression analysis with the incentive approaches with dummy variables for the 25% and 50% 
incentive plans and 0% as the base group; this served to  show the comparative effect of the 
incentivization plans by providing a regression equation depicting the effect of dummy-variable 
incentive plan and area within which the study was collected. The resulting regression equation 
was therefore be as depicted below: 
CR= Ct + b1A + b2HHSize + b3NC + b4AD + b5AG + b6IP25 + b7IP50 + e 
Where  
CR = Contribution ratio (total contribution/total expected contribution) 
Ct = Constant term 
b1 = Area coefficient 
A= Area of study (rural) 
b2= HHSize coefficient 
HHSize = household size 
b3= Number of children coefficient 
NC= number of children 
b4= Number of adults coefficient  
AD = number of adults 
b5= Age coefficient 
AG = age 
b6= 25% incentive plan coefficient 
IP25 = Incentive plan  
B7= 25% incentive plan coefficient 
IP50 = Incentive plan  
e= error term  
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The third objective, to analyze differences in health savings between urban and rural areas was 
analyzed through an independent t-test assessing the means of the two populations – rural and 
urban – as well as through the regression equation utilized in the second objective; a dummy 
variable indicating the area where the study was conducted was included therefore providing a 
basis of comparison of the effect of location on the amounts collected under different 
incentivization plans. The variable was coded 1 for rural and 0 for urban. 
 
3.5. Research Quality- validity, reliability and objectivity of the research 
The retrospective data collection exercise for the study was conducted under strict supervision and 
is therefore inferred to be free of error or manipulation. The congruency in understanding between 
the researcher's intention and the respondents was confirmed through pilot studies; studies which 
shaped the eventual questions included in the research initiative. The questions were therefore 
deemed to measure what was intended to be measured and the replicability of the study was also 
ensured thereby deeming the data valid and reliable. 
 
3.6. Ethical issues in research 
 
3.6.1 Informed consent  
Written informed consent to participate in the study were obtained from all the study respondents 
prior to participation in the study. Only participants who have read and understood the study 
information were allowed to make a decision for participation. A written consent was sought from 
them before the start of data collection. The research team ensured that all consent information 
was provided in understandable languages, and was translated in vernacular language where 
necessary.  
 
3.6.2. Ethical clearance  
Confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements were signed by the collecting body and all other 
parties privy to the information gathered. The data was also held securely by the respondents and 
subsequent non-disclosure agreements signed by all other parties initially unmentioned in the 
original signing. No personal information was therefore disclosed or used in the study hence the 
ethical integrity of the research initiative was maintained throughout the collection and analysis 
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process. Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the Ethics Review Committee of Africa 
Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF), and approval from the research investigators was 





CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis and the presentation of data collected for the study.  The study 
focused on retrospective data on ROSCA mobile-health wallet (m-health wallet) participants.  The 
overall objective of the study was to evaluate the effects of introducing financial (monetary) 
incentives to healthcare savings. This chapter is delineated into four main sections – descriptive 
statistics; differences in savings between the incentive groups; effect of financial incentives on 
health-savings levels; differences in health savings between urban and rural areas. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section provides a description of the individuals involved in the study. The section therefore 
serves to provide context for the inferences made in this chapter in response to the study objectives. 
4.2.1Age of respondents 
In assessing the age of respondents, it emerged that the modal response category was 41 to 50 with 
77 respondents. None of the respondents was below the age of 20. Figure 4.1 provides a summary 
of the different age groups and the various frequencies for each category. 
 























4.2.2 House-hold size 
Most of the respondents had four to six members in their households; this was the modal category. 
Only one respondent indicated more than 14 members within his/her household. Figure 4.2 
provides a summary of responses in this category. 
Figure 4.2 Household size 
 
 
4.2.3 Number of children 
The age group zero to three had the most number of respondents in the question assessing total 
number of children within households. Responses in this category were skewed to the right with 
most respondents indicating fewer than seven to ten children. Figure 4.3 provides a graphical 



















Figure 4.3 Number of children 
 
4.2.4 Gender of respondents  
Most respondents were female (186). The data therefore indicates a majority female participations 
in ROSCA and consequently, in the mobile-health wallet (m-health wallet) study. Figure 4.4. 
provides a summary of responses for this variable. 
 


































4.2.5 Marital status of respondents 
Most respondents were married and living with their spouses (152 respondents). Only two of the 
respondents that participated the study for a period of three months under the specific 
incentivization plans were not married but living with partners whereas 54 were single or living 
alone. Figure 4.5 shows a summary of responses in this category. 
Figure 4.5 Marital status of respondents 
 
4.2.6 Employment status of respondents 
The modal category for this variable was "self-employed" with 154 respondents. The second most 
populous category was "casual workers" with 28 respondents. A summary of responses under this 
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Figure 4.6 Employment status 
 
 
4.3 Differences in savings between the incentive groups 
All three groups were assessed, by the means, to establish whether or not they were from the same 
population – a conclusion that would indicate that there was no significant difference in 
accumulated funds over the three-month period. For each pairing, Levene's test of equality of 
variance was conducted to indicate the t-statistic to be interpreted. The null hypothesis for the test 
indicated homogeneity of variance for the pair. The analysis output for the various categories are 
shown below. 
4.3.1 Groups 0% and 25% incentive 
The mean contribution ratio at 0% was 1.587 whereas that at 25% was 0.957. This therefore 
indicated better savings were reported for the 0-incentive category than for the 25% category. The 
analysis output further indicated that the difference between the two tests was significant with 
Levene's test indicating that the variance between the two groups was not equal. The interpreted t-
statistic was therefore 3.439 with a p-value of 0.01 thereby indicating that the two samples were 












































0.00% 75 1.587 1.572 0.182 
25.00% 45 0.956 0.183 0.027 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CONTRIBUTION RATIO Equal 
variances 
assumed 





    3.44 77.30 0.00 0.63 0.18 0.27 1.00 
 
4.3.2 Groups 0% and 50% incentive 
The mean contribution ratio at 0% was 1.587 whereas that at 50% was 0.873. This therefore 
indicated better savings were reported for the 0-incentive category than for the 50% category. The 
analysis output further indicated that the difference between the two means was significant with 
Levene's test indicating that the variance between the two groups was not equal. The interpreted t-
statistic was therefore 3.856 with a p-value less than 0.01 thereby indicating that the two samples 
















0.00% 75 1.587 1.572 0.182 
50.00% 88 0.873 0.338 0.036 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 

























    3.86 79.84 0.00 0.71 0.19 0.35 1.08 
 
 
4.3.3 Groups 25% and 50% incentive 
The mean contribution ratio at 25% was 0.956 whereas that at 50% was 0.873. This therefore 
indicated better savings were reported for the 25%-incentive category than for the 50% category. 
The Levene's test indicated that the variance between the two groups was not equal. The interpreted 
t-statistic was therefore 1.826 with a p-value of 0.07 which was higher than the critical value 0.05 
thereby indicating that the two samples were from the same populations. Table 4.3 shows the group 
















25.00% 45 0.956 0.183 0.027 
50.00% 88 0.873 0.338 0.036 
 
 






t-test for Equality of Means 






























    1.83 130.5
6 
0.07 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.17 
 
 
4.4 Effect of financial incentives on health-savings levels 
To assess the effect of incentives, area of study, household size, number of children, number of 
adults and age of respondents, a regression analysis with contribution ratio as the dependent 
variable was run. The variables incentive, and area of study were included in the model as dummy 




Table 4.4 Regression analysis output 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .436a .190 .166 .935 .190 7.845 6 201 .000 










95.0% Confidence Interval for 
B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 (Constant) 1.855 .204  9.108 .000 1.453 2.256 
Area -.571 .162 -.242 -3.527 .001 -.890 -.252 
# Children -.043 .031 -.094 -1.391 .166 -.104 .018 
# Adults .121 .051 .152 2.371 .019 .020 .222 
Age .000 .001 -.029 -.457 .648 -.001 .001 
25%  -.386 .186 -.156 -2.073 .039 -.754 -.019 
50% -.746 .151 -.361 -4.957 .000 -1.043 -.449 








1 HH Size .b . . . .000 
a. Dependent Variable: CONTRIBUTION RATIO 






From the output, the adjusted R-squared value indicated that the model accounted for 19% of the 
variations in the dependent variable – contribution ratio. The variable Household size was 
excluded from the model whereas age and number of children were not significant.  
Incentive plans were however surprisingly associated with an overall decrease in overall 
contribution. The 25% plan, controlling or other factors, had a coefficient of -0.386 whereas the 
50% plan had a coefficient of -0.746; this therefore indicated that persons under no incentivization 
had higher contributions (over and above the expected contribution) than those under the incentive 
plans. This therefore indicates that the study did not successfully show that incentivization plans 
were associated with increase in contribution by the individuals in the program. 
 
4.5 Differences in health savings between urban and rural areas 
The mean contribution ratio for the rural population was 0.990 whereas that of the urban population 
was 1.622. This therefore indicated better savings were reported among the urban than the rural 
population. Levene's test indicated that the variance between the two groups was not equal. The 
interpreted t-statistic was therefore -2.330 with a p-value of 0.024 which was less than the critical 
value 0.05 thereby indicating that the two samples were from different populations. Table 4.5 
shows the group statistics and independent samples t-test output. 
Table 4.5 Independent samples t-test rural and urban  
Group Statistics 







1 156 0.990 0.219 0.018 












t-test for Equality of Means 





















95.58 0.00 -3.99 206.
00 





    -2.33 51.4
3 
0.02 -0.63 0.27 -1.18 -0.09 
 
The regression equation depicted in section 4.4 indicated that persons in urban areas saved more 




CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1. Differences in savings between the incentive groups 
When comparing performance in savings between the different incentive levels, it surprisingly 
appears that higher savings were reported for the 0%-incentive category rather than the 25% and 
50%- incentive categories. When comparing the 25%-category with the 50%- category, again it 
appears that the lower category of 25% performs better. In other words, higher incentives to save 
for health led to lower savings’ amounts level. As mentioned by Gneezy, these findings go against 
what economists often emphasize “incentives matter”. The “basic law of behavior” would state 
that higher incentives lead to more effort to perform and in that case to improve savings’ behavior 
(Gneezy et al., 2011). However Corgnet (Corgnet et al., 2015) also raised that financial incentives 
have two kinds of effects: the standard direct price effect, which makes the incentivized behavior 
more attractive, and an indirect psychological effect. In some cases, the psychological effect works 
in an opposite direction to the price effect and can crowd out the incentivized behavior. Moving 
from no incentive to a positive incentive can drastically change the framing of the interaction and 
shift an individual’s decision frame from social to monetary. In addition, these results support 
findings from the Engel and al. (1994) study which highlights the complexity of incentivization 
plans and the need to cautiously structure them to avoid perverse effects.  In a context of savings 
for “health” in a social savings group could be linked to the differences observed between a social 
and a monetary reward. Indeed these differences may also change individuals’ beliefs about the 
behavior of others: for example, people may believe incentives are in place because the social 
norm is that people do not contribute. 
The literature review also highlights the influence of extrinsic rewards in crowding out image 
motivation by diluting the signal to oneself or others of a voluntary contribution. In the context of 
saving for health, the ROCSAs members are saving for the health of their respective families, 
which could be considered as a private matter. These findings could imply that incentives for 
voluntary and private contributions should be provided confidentially rather than publicly, to 
reduce the effect on image motivation mentioned by Ariely. 
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5.2. Effect of financial incentives on health-savings levels in comparison with other 
variables 
Finding of this study indicate that incentive plans are associated with an overall decrease by in 
savings in comparison to household size or number of children, which were associated with 
increase in savings. In other words, financial incentives have a perverse effect on savings levels. 
As mentioned by Keynes, there are multiple motives for saving. The calculation motive (which in 
the case of this study are the financial or monetary incentives) is listed as one among seven other 
motives for saving. The calculation motive for saving is explained as a way to enjoy interest and 
appreciation because a larger real consumption at a later date is preferred to a smaller immediate 
consumption. In view of the findings, one could assume that in the context of saving for health, 
the “precautionary motive” for saving would prevail rather than the calculation motive.  Indeed a 
better knowledge and understanding of future health risks could be a stronger motivation factor 
than financial incentives only. As such, interventions sensitizing about future health risks such as 
health awareness campaigns, or so-called “information, education and communication” materials, 
etc. could have a higher impact on savings for health than financial incentives.  
The study also finds that larger household size have a positive effect on savings.  Therefore one 
could assume that larger households with higher number of members are faced with higher 
incidence of health events (especially with children under five) and are therefore more aware of 
health risks; which would lead them to be more inclined to save and protect themselves than 
households with smaller number of members. This is in line with the additional motives for savings 
indicated by Katona (1975) which list “children’s needs” as a key reason for savings. 
The negative effect of financial incentives is also observed in task performance especially in the 
context of “Result-Based Financing” models. As indicated by Oxman (Oxman & Fretheim, 2008) 
financial incentives can have negative effects especially among individuals with lack of intrinsic 
motivation. According to him, Decreased intrinsic motivation negatively affects worker autonomy, 
purpose, altruism and competence. Some studies also indicate that monetary incentives produce 
poor performance. Therefore one could review the actual intrinsic motivations the ROSCAs’ 
members had for saving.  
These results are more so unexpected in a context of saving as a group (ROSCAs with peer 
pressure to save) where a specific commitment device earmarked for health (m-health wallet), 
37 
 
which both interventions were meant to increase the discipline for saving. However one should 
also observe the intrinsic motivation, social perception of saving for a private matter as health in a 
social setting.  
5.3. To analyze differences in health savings between urban and rural areas 
Better savings were reported among the urban than the rural population. In addition, it appears that 
individuals in urban areas were more likely to contribute higher amounts than those in rural areas. 
This could be explained by the rural-urban financial inclusion gap. As indicated in the FSD 
FinAccess report, 2016, the usage of both formal and informal financial services providers, 
including ROSCAs, is higher in urban areas (informal services usage is 40.1% in rural vs 43.8% 
in urban).  
It is worth mentioning that the lower levels of savings might be attributed to the lower threshold 
of savings selected per group. Urban savings’ groups selected higher level of saving amounts as a 
group than their rural counterparts. However the ROSCAs selected were all selected from similar 
income groups. Main differences between the groups were economic activities: where urban 
ROSCAs members were mostly traders and rural ones were mostly farmers. The latter usually 
have seasonal income, which might have affected the savings’ behaviors observed in  the limited 
study period of 6 months.   
5.4 Recommendations and conclusions 
The study evaluated the effects of introducing financial (monetary) incentives in increasing health 
savings in a context among savings’ groups using a “mobile-health wallet (m-health wallet) which 
is a mobile platform dedicated saving and spending for healthcare expenses only.  Through a 
quantitative study, the m-health wallet savings product was introduced among low-income earners 
who are members of 20 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) in Nairobi and Uasin 
Gishu counties. Data from the m-health wallet platform among the ROSCAs members were 
collected and analyzed- using a simple regression analysis- to examine savings’ behaviors 
(depending on the monetary incentives) and differences between savings categories and urban and 
rural areas. 
Our findings suggest that the financial (monetary) incentives negatively affected the savings’ 
levels; the higher the incentives, the lower the savings’ amounts. Comparing to other variables, 
38 
 
such as the household size, number of children which positively affected the savings levels, the 
monetary incentives were found to have a perverse effect on the savings’ behaviors.   
In view of these unexpected results, the vast literature around financial and social rewards needs 
to be revisited. Although it has been strongly suggested that financial rewards are required to 
incentivize savings, it is important to structure it in a manner that takes into account the social 
context of ROSCAs.  
Therefore, when introducing a health savings product among ROSCAs, managers and policy 
makers should care about both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to induce and sustain desired 
financial behaviors such as savings. These findings reinforce the need to keep studying both 
economics and psychological aspects of financial behaviors in tandem as always postulated the 
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